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The Constitutional
Debacle and
External Relations
By Dr Simon Duke,   Dr Simon Duke,   Dr Simon Duke,   Dr Simon Duke,   Dr Simon Duke, Associate Professor – EIPA Maastricht*
The Convention on the Future of Europe shared a common
desire to make the external relations of the EU more
effective and visible. It was thus unsurprising when attention
focused at an early stage on the need for a European
External Representative, combining the High Representative's
functions with that of the Commissioner for External Relations,
in what was to become known as the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs (UMFA).1 Logically, the presence of a
Foreign "Minister" called for some form of supporting
ministry which became the European External Action Service
(EEAS). Other modifications introduced into the Constitu-
tional Treaty with potentially wide-ranging ramifications for
the external relations field included the assumption by the
Union of legal personality and the change of Commission
delegations into EU delegations under the Union Minister.
The creation of the
Minister's position was
arguably the most signifi-
cant innovation of the
Constitutional Treaty and
thus one of the main
casualties of the French
and Dutch referenda.
Nostalgia for the constitu-
tion that might have been
and hand-wringing over the results of the referenda should
not preclude a much-needed debate about the future of EU
external relations.
The European Council called on 16-17 June 2005 for
a "period of reflection" which "will be used to enable a broad
"The Constitutional Debacle and External Relations" argues that even with a ratified
Constitutional Treaty, many of the innovations in the external relations area would
have been difficult to introduce. In the absence of a Constitutional Treaty for the
foreseeable future the author sees limited scope for major overhaul of EU external
relations within the scope of the existing treaties and cautions against any temptation
to cherry-pick the Constitutional Treaty. The current period of uncertainty calls for
open, but structured, debate. In light of this the author argues strongly for the
continuation of the deliberations of the working group on the European External
Action Service, albeit in a slightly broader format, since their discussions could serve
as a valuable platform for an open debate about the role of the EU on the world stage.
debate to take place in each of our countries, involving
citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments
and political parties". The "special role" of the Commission
in contributing to this debate was noted.2  The Luxembourg
Presidency also called for "Plan D" or, in other words, a
period of dialogue and debate. Jean-Claude Juncker was
insistent that any "Plan D" shall not involve a renegotiation
of the Constitutional Treaty.3  This brief essay will consider
a possible avenue ahead for the period of reflection and for
Plan D.
The invitation for dialogue and debate begs many
questions, amongst them being: Who is to conduct this
dialogue and debate? What if some of those involved insist
on renegotiating aspects of the Constitutional Treaty?
Presumably, since it is difficult to move ahead with the
constitution  in toto, the
dialogue might also inclu-
de specific proposals per-
taining to parts of the do-
cument? If, however, there
is to be no renegotiation,
what adaptations might
sensibly be made to the
existing treaties as mo-
dified at Nice? All of these
are issues that the European Council has promised to
elaborate upon at the beginning of 2006.
On the first issue, it is apparent that the dialogue and
debate must be as broad as possible, especially bearing in
mind the public criticism and even hostility towards what is
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
T
h
e
 
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
D
e
b
a
c
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
Creation of the Minister's
position was arguably the
most significant innovation
of the Constitutional Treaty.
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seen as an aloof bureaucracy in Brussels. Although there is
a certain irony, given that the Convention was designed to
be open and to consult with as many interested parties as
possible, any attempt to fix the Constitutional Treaty behind
closed doors would exacerbate existing public concerns
regarding not only the constitution itself but the process by
which it was drawn up.
The argument that the Constitutional Treaty needs
"renegotiation" depends of course on what exactly is
understood by that term. If renegotiation means scrapping
the existing Constitutional Treaty and a new Convention in
the next few years, the risk is apparent – it would lead to
renewed and divisive debates amongst the Member States
and any resultant document may well fail to reach EU-wide
consensus. So, what options are there?
The Polish-backed idea of a "constitution lite", whereby
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty should be extricated and
co-exist alongside the existing treaties has some attraction.
However, the concept of co-existence would still imply
substantial adaptation and amendment, including solving
awkward contradictions between the respective documents
(on, for example, the pillar structures). Presumably such an
exercise would also cause a few conniptions in the European
Courts.
The next option is to adapt the existing treaties, not by
merging as was suggested above, but by incorporating
choice morsels from the Constitutional Treaty into the
treaties. This approach is not without its risks since there are
already warnings about the "secret cherry-pickers" and
efforts to introduce the constitution, or at least parts of it, via
the back door.4 The prospective UMFA and the EEAS are
often mentioned as parts of the Constitutional Treaty that
are ripe for picking. But, aside from the concerns about the
political astuteness of going down this road, how feasible
is it?
"Cherry-picking" the Union Minister and
the European External Action Service
In the first place the UMFA is linked to a whole series of
reforms in the external relations area – where he is not only
"double-hatted", as is commonly observed, but triple-
hatted. In the first place the Minister's role is shaped by his
relations with the President of the European Council who "in
his or her level and in that capacity" ensure the external
representation of the Union in matters concerning CFSP,
"without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs" (Art.1-22 (2)).5
His role is also shaped by the Foreign Affairs Council,
which he "presides over" (Art. 1-28 (3)). Even a seemingly
innocent phrase like this immediately raises questions
concerning the capacity (or hat) in which the Minister chairs
the Foreign Affairs Council and who then represents the
Commission's interests? The Foreign Affairs Council also
implies major changes for the Presidency since the Presi-
dency of Council configurations, "other than that of Foreign
Affairs" shall be held by the Member States representative
in the Council (Art. I-24 (7)). The arrangements for the
chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council and his ability to
make proposals are perhaps the most revolutionary in the
sense that they imply a complete reversal of the current
arrangements, under which the High Representative merely
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Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Minister-in-waiting?
© Council of the European Union, 2000-2005E
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assists the Presidency (see below). Not only would this
significantly undermine the role of national Foreign Ministers
regarding CFSP, it would also require enormous skill (and
nerve) to ensure that this role is consistent with his
Commission roles and procedures.
It is also unclear how smoothly the Political and Security
Committee, addressing CFSP issues and chaired by the
Minister's deputy, would have worked with Coreper, chaired
by the rotating Presidency and responsible for other external
relations issues, who refer matters to the Foreign Affairs
Council, chaired by the Minister, for decision. Complex
issues might also have emerged when it comes to the
chairing and organisation of working groups.
However, in his third
role, the language of the
Constitutional Treaty is a
good deal vaguer. The
Minister shall also be a
Vice-President of the Com-
mission where, somewhat
ineloquently, he "shall be
responsible within the
Commission for responsi-
bilities incumbent on it in
external relations and for
coordinating other aspects
of the Union's external
action" (Art. I-28 (4)). In
exercising these respon-
sibilities within the Commission, the Minister shall be bound
by Commission responsibilities "to the extent that they are
consistent" with his duties and mandate vis-à-vis the Council
– thus potentially setting the scene for numerous turf
battles. This raises two immediate problems: first, the
UMFA is appointed by the European Council and answers
to the Foreign Affairs Council, which raises issues regarding
his accountability towards the President of the Commission
and; second, the question of consistency between the
Commission and Council roles is bound to set up institutional
friction and will thus require enormous, if not superhuman,
tact and diplomacy from the Minister.
It would be difficult to appoint a nominally triple-hatted
Solana as the Union's UMFA on an ad hoc basis without
raising considerable difficulties for the existing treaties
which state, quite clearly, that it is "the Presidency who shall
represent the Union in matters coming within the common
foreign and security policy" and that it is the Presidency who
"shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions
taken under this capacity and it shall in principle express the
position of the Union in international organisations and
international conferences". Furthermore, the Presidency
"shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council
[Solana]" (Art. 18 TEU). Thus, if the UMFA were to have any
teeth at all, it would entail amending the existing institutional
roles of the European Council, the Council, the Council
General Secretariat, the Presidency and the European
Commission.
The fate of the EEAS is intimately linked to that of the
UMFA since, according to the Constitutional Treaty, "the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be assisted by a
European External Action Service" (Art. III-296 (3)). The
absence of the UMFA would immediately call into question
the logic of having an EEAS and, if it were instituted on an
ad hoc basis, the same contentious issues encountered by
the Council-Commission working group on the EEAS during
the last year of their discussions, would remain. On the
Commission side it remains unclear what such a Service
might incorporate beyond the current DG RELEX (what
desks in DG Enlargement or DG Development might be
incorporated?). On the Council side the Service would
presumably incorporate DG-E and the Policy Unit, but the
picture becomes more murky with the Military Staff or the
Joint Situation Centre.6 Even a minimalist Service, built
around DG RELEX and the Council Secretariat's DG-E
would cause considerable upheaval, especially since it
would also imply the restructuring of the Commission's
External Service.
Given these tensions, there may even be some interest
in letting the EEAS quietly
slip away – notably from
the Commission side. This
would be a pity though
since the wider discussions
provoked by the notion of
the EEAS (such as the
nature of European-level
diplomacy, the problems
encountered by the in-
creasingly artificial divi-
sion of responsibilities in
external relations between
the  communautaire as-
pects and the CFSP ones,
the role of diplomatic
services of the Member States, the role of the delegations
and so forth) are of immense value and should therefore
continue. At a minimum, they may help to identify ways of
working together more efficiently and to carry out structural
improvements that do not necessitate changes to any legal
texts. For instance, enhancing coherence between the
Commission and the Council does not necessarily require
treaty amendment, nor does the assumption by the Member
States of an enhanced role in the external relations of the
Union; nor, finally, does some adjustment of the delegations
to include more national or even Council Secretariat
officials.
There are, however, limits to how far adjustments can
go without necessitating treaty adjustment. For instance, as
was mentioned, it is quite possible to review seconding
arrangements to and within the existing Commission
delegations without treaty change but this would leave
important issues, such as accountability and reporting,
ambiguous in the absence of a central external relations
coordinator such as the UMFA. The non treaty-based
adjustments mentioned above are certainly worth exploring
but all will eventually run into the lack of a central coordinating
figure (and Service) to hold it together.
The Constitutional Treaty also continued the theme of
flexibility, introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty and continued
in the Nice version, by introducing a number of new types
of flexibility – those permitting groups of Member States to
be entrusted with a task to "protect the Union's values and
serve its interests", enhanced cooperation and permanent
structured cooperation. There is little to stop the Member
States moving towards more flexible arrangements of
cooperation, especially in the security and defence areas
where it could be argued that they already exist, albeit in
rather ad hoc forms.  Arguably this has happened in the
case of the role of the EU3 (France, Germany and the
United Kingdom) in Iran but at the cost of sidelining the
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Non treaty-based
adjustments are certainly
worth exploring but all
will eventually run into
the lack of a central
coordinating figure (and
Service) to hold it together.E
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High Representative. This
raises the underlying con-
cern of the extent to which
the EU Member States,
notably the three just
mentioned, really wish for
a strong Minister and how
their own Foreign Minis-
ters would relate to him. If
history is any guide, there
may be instances where
delegation is preferred
(such as the Western Bal-
kans) but others where a
group of Member States
may prefer to take the initiative (Iran). This again suggests
that any Minister would not only have to exercise enormous
skill in manoeuvring within the EU institutions, but also with
the Member States.
Between the devil and the deep blue sea …
To conclude, the problem with "cherry-picking", quite aside
from potential political objections, is that while it may be
possible to have a UMFA with some sort of EEAS, it is not
possible to have the UMFA and EEAS envisaged in the
Constitutional Treaty. This does not get us around the
awkward problem that many of the concerns about the
current system of EU external relations – ineffectiveness, the
lack of coherence in EU external relations, the growing
artificiality of the divide between the communautaire and
intergovernmental aspects of external relations, the
cacophony in external representation of the Union and the
growing importance of European-level diplomacy – still
apply. The Constitutional Treaty should not be thought of
as a panacea since it is far from clear that, had the
Constitutional Treaty been ratified by all Member States,
either the Minister or the EEAS would have proven workable
in practice.
In spite of the negative referendum results in France and
The Netherlands, any ensuing "broad debate" should build
upon strong public support for a greater EU role in the
foreign and security policy areas, as expressed in successive
editions of the Eurobarometer, in a clear and transparent
manner.7 Traditionally these are the areas of that are the
most opaque in the Member States, but the EU should not
forsake the chance to lead a public discussion on the role
that the Union should play on the international scene.
Dialogue and debate should build upon the current
discussions taking place between the Council, the
Commission and the Member States over the EEAS. Although
it has been argued that the EEAS makes little sense without
a Minister, the discussions have broader resonance and
significance for EU external relations. Many of the themes
discussed above – issues of coherence, inter-pillar tensions,
the role of the delegations, the future of the Presidency and
CFSP, relations and responsibilities of the external relations
directorate-generals in the Commission and the Council
and issues of legal identity – will need to be touched upon
in this group. The work of the group is therefore far from
irrelevant and could prove to be of central importance in
outlining a way ahead for EU external relations.
Assuming the need for change is acknowledged, an
expanded working group, building upon the original EEAS
working group composed of a small number of senior
Commission and Council
Secretariat officials, should
be constituted to include
senior national represen-
tatives as well as senior
MEPs. The discussions,
which will be difficult and
may well entail painful
reform, should then form
the basis for an open public
debate since, as successive
opinion polls and the refe-
renda themselves show,
sizeable majorities in the
EU desire a more coherent
and effective European voice on the international stage. The
outcome of this debate (as well as appropriate ones in other
areas of EU activity) will then suggest whether the Union can
live within the parameters of the existing treaties, the extent
to which they can be amended, or whether completely new
arrangements are called for. Only when the EU that is
desirable emerges will the question of whether the Consti-
tutional Treaty has any future be answerable but, for the time
being, this should not be the main focus of dialogue and
debate. ::
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
* The author would like to thank the editors of Eipascope for
their helpful suggestions.
1 The position was originally referred to by the politically less
jarring term European External Representative, but it lacked
the weight and cachet of the "Union Minister" title.
2 Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the
Member States of the European Union on the Ratification of
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, D/05/3,
Brussels, 18 June 2005.
3 See comments by Jean-Claude Juncker at the Luxembourg
Presidency official website, http://www.eu2005.lu/fr/
actualites/communiques/2005/06/16jclj-ratif/index.html
4 Liam Fox, 'Beware the secret cherry-pickers', The Times, 10
June 2005.
5 It was agreed by a Council decision that Javier Solana, the
current CFSP High Representative, should become the Union's
first Union Minister for Foreign Affairs 'on the day of entry into
force of the constitution', see, 2595th Meeting of the Council
of the European Union, Press Release, 29 June 2004, 10995/
04 (Presse 214).
6 DG-E is responsible for many of the external relations aspects
of the Council Secretariat's work, including defence and civilian
crisis management aspects. Approximately 200 officials, some
seconded, work in DG-E. The Policy Unit, or Policy Planning and
Early Warning Unit, was established under the Amsterdam
revisions to the treaties. It includes approximately 25 seconded
diplomats, divided into Task Forces along geographical or
thematic lines, who will monitor, give policy advice and recom-
mendations to the CFSP High Representative.
7 There is strong support for a common defence and security
policy amongst 77% of the recipients (the strongest support
coming from the ten new Member States who average 85%),
for details see Standard Eurobarometer 63, July 2005 (Brus-
sels: European Commission), pp.30-35.
Dialogue and debate
should build upon the
current discussions taking
place between the
Council, the Commission
and the Member States
over the EEAS.
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